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ABSTRACT

This study focused on the factors in negotiations that cause impasse. The major hypothesis, "There is a significant difference in the perceptions of school board members and teacher executive leadership regarding impasse factors," was upheld. Data were collected from board members, administrators, teacher association officials, and negotiators from 19 randomly selected school districts in six western New York State counties and correlated using a Pearson Product Moment Correlation. The factors were then rotated orthogonally. The varimax rotated factors yielded a total of 15 teacher-school board factors all statistically significantly different between teachers and boards. The findings support the conclusion that there exists a significant polarization between teachers and boards. (Author)

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FACTORS LEADING TO IMPASSE IN TEACHER-SCHOOL BOARD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Paper Presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting
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FACTORS LEADING TO IMPASSE IN TEACHER-SCHOOL
BOARD COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The 1967 Public Employees Fair Employment Act of New York State was conceived to grant to New York State public employees the same right as Federal employees to organize and bargain collectively. President Kennedy's executive order 10988 in 1962 gave Federal employees this right. The Taylor Law, as the New York legislation became popularly known, called for the creation of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB is the agency responsible for regulating collective bargaining in the public sector. This act was a milestone in teacher-board negotiations in New York State. Teachers received a source of legitimized power by the fact that boards were now forced to actively negotiate with the teachers to reach an acceptable agreement on terms and conditions of employment.

The Taylor Law has had many operational problems in the education sector. Approximately 80% of all public employee impasses and strikes in New York State since 1967 have occurred in the area of education. Even considering the assumption that strikes by firemen or policemen are more crucial and might not happen as often, the 80% figure is still very large.

The Taylor Law procedure allows either party to flatly reject the other side's proposal which if not resolved, leads to impasse. One party may lack the necessary power to alter the other's proposal, but it has the legal power to reject it and rely on mediation and fact finding for an acceptable compromise. Teacher negotiators tend to utilize this procedure frequently. Many of the high conflict issues are items that teachers feel justified in achieving, and are critical teacher interest areas such as salary, fringe benefits, teacher decision making, curriculum decisions, etc. Frustration, alienation, time, money, and a worsening of teacher-board harmony, which carries over in building level administration and the teaching/learning

process, become negative problems associated with probable impasse.

Increased knowledge is needed to determine what factor or clusters of factors in teacher-school board negotiations tend to cause impasses. This knowledge would be helpful in leading to a reduction in alienation between teacher groups, administrators, and boards of education. Impasses and strikes are costly to all parties concerned. There is little benefit derived from impasses and pressure tactics in the negotiations process. Many hours of meaningful negotiations are wasted when both sides reach an impasse on an issue. This problem is magnified when the impasse proceeding is bogged down and a stalemate arises. This, of course, leads to a high degree of alienation between both sides.

A breakdown in the formal education process through a strike usually results in detrimental consequences for children, educators, and school boards. Sometimes the scars left in the negotiation process are slow to heal and tend to be renewed each time contract talks are resumed. The amount of power each side perceives it possesses in relation to a certain issue may be directly correlated with the possibility of conflict and impasse in that area. If these issues could be isolated, problem areas could be identified and perhaps dealt with in a unique way. This could lead to predictive measures and more knowledge in the field of negotiations.

The Study

The position presented in the study under discussion here viewed negotiations as perceived through both school board and teacher executive leadership. Priorities of items to be negotiated for both groups were examined in the light of identifying what factor or factor clusters of these items negotiated produced conflict and alienation leading eventually to impasses.

The population for this study was the 105 school districts found within the

six county regions of Western New York State. From this population, nineteen randomly selected school districts utilizing Champion's[1] Tables of random numbers were selected which provided the data collected from board of education members, chief school officers and teachers association leaders. In each of the nineteen participating school districts an identical questionnaire was administered to each participant. The data obtained were organized into two basic groups for analysis. The first group, teachers, included teacher association leaders, teacher negotiating team members, and professional negotiators for teachers. The second group, school boards, included members of the board of education, the superintendent or chief school officer, and professional negotiators for boards.

Research Questionnaire

The initial search for impasse items began with an extensive search of the literature which was followed up by interviews with participating school district teacher association presidents. Visits were made to the western region office of the New York State United Teachers (N.Y.S.U.T.) to locate actual items that had caused impasses previously in school districts. Contact was also made with the New York State office of Employer-Employee Relations who had published a document pertaining to impasse items. Personal interviews were also conducted with officers of N.Y.S.U.T. and documents related to impasses they had prepared studied. An interview with the president of the Erie County School Boards Association provided additional insight into potential impasse problems. All of this information was helpful in structuring the research questionnaire utilized in this study. The questionnaire went through several revisions and item analysis prior to the final document of 55 items being produced. A pilot study was undertaken to test the reliability of the questionnaire and evaluate the procedures established for con-

ducting the study. A school district with suburban and rural characteristics was selected for the pilot study. The Spearman-Brown test of reliability yielded a high correlation in regard to both teacher (.91) and school board (.67) groups. The smaller sample of board members most likely resulted in the lower correlation for this group.

The research questionnaire sought respondents' perceptions to 55 items on a Likert-type scale employing a seven scale rank order from strongly reject (1) to strongly desire (7). An emphasis was placed on the individual responding to the questionnaire items as if they were proposals in a negotiations scene and what value they placed on that particular item. The questions were randomly placed so that the respondents would not have to focus their attention on one specific area at a time (e.g., all monetary items) and possibly relate them to each other introducing a possible bias.

Results

The 55 questionnaire items were correlated using Pearson Product Moment Correlations to obtain a correlation matrix. This matrix was then factor analyzed for the two sub-groups, teachers and school boards using the principal factoring method without iteration. This method extracts components or factors according to the maximum amount of variance. The first component extracts the most amount and continues until all the variance is extracted. Because of the large number of original variables, it was arbitrarily decided that the number of factors to be extracted would be ten. This assured that most of the variance would be extracted even though some factors would have low factor leadings and not account for much variance.[2]

The 55 items were factor analyzed for both teachers and school boards in line with the original problem The factor loadings on each factor were then

TABLE 1

TEACHER FACTORS WITH RESULTING HIGH FACTOR LOADING VARIABLES

Factor	Nominal	Factor Loading	Mean
Tenure/Job Security	010 - increased tenure period 5 to 7 years	-.79	1.3
	045 - provide tenure after 3 years	.71	5.9
	015 - eliminate tenure	-.58	1.4
	007 - tenure after 5 years	.56	3.6
	033 - seniority clause-preferred treatment	.46	5.8
Shared Decision Making	047 - policies affecting day by day working conditions controlled by principal	.60	3.1
	019 - 3rd party binding arbitration	-.57	6.2
	018 - board sole decision to establish pupil hours	.58	2.2
	039 - classroom discipline policy decided by school building principal	.55	2.7
	020 - term and conditions limit to salaries, fringe, other economic remuneration	.54	2.1
	025 - strengthening building principal administration of school	.45	4.1
Merit Pay	013 - salary increase merit only	.79	1.5
	049 - merit pay plan	.71	1.6
Supplemental Time Off	016 - personal days 3	.68	5.8
	008 - paid sick days 15	.59	5.4

TABLE 1 - Continued

Factor	Nominal	Factor Loading	Mean
Shared Decision Making Relating to Classroom Working Conditions and Policy	035 - uniform discipline paid shared decision making	.66	6.3
	032 - shared decision making curriculum matters	.65	6.3
	053 - class size limitation policy	.63	5.9
	014 - teacher student load maximum number	.56	5.3
Assigned After School Duties	043 - pupil monitoring activities divided among teachers part time	.63	3.2
	048 - after school meetings mandatory for teachers	.59	2.1
Increased School Duties	012 - teachers assume related activity	.64	3.1
	044 - decreased classroom instructional time	-.58	2.8
	003 - decreased power building administrator	.44	3.9
	028 - eliminate outside classroom activities	.41	5.4
Organizational Power	030 - shared decision making teacher association boards - teacher dismissal/retention	.62	5.6
	011 - complete academic freedom	.60	3.3
	054 - peer evaluation tenure sole decision retention/dismissal by teacher committee	.53	3.8

TABLE 2

SCHOOL BOARD FACTORS WITH RESULTING HIGH FACTOR LOADING VARIABLES

Factor	Nominal	Factor Loading	Mean
Supplemental Fringe Benefits	038 - paid life insurance	.78	2.4
	024 - paid dental plan	.74	2.1
	034 - paid extended hospital	.74	3.4
	052 - paid hospital plan	.67	3.4
Shared Decision Making on Educational Policy	032 - shared decision making curriculum matters	.84	4.7
	035 - uniform discipline policy established shared	.81	4.4
	042 - shared decision making teacher recruitment staff-administration	.61	2.6
Teacher Working Conditions	002 - maintenance standards	.79	2.8
	053 - class size limitation policy	.73	3.0
	014 - teacher/student load maximum number	.60	3.5
	028 - elimination outside classroom activities	.60	2.7
Accountability	049 - merit pay plan	.71	4.6
	050 - management rights non-negotiable	.66	5.3
	008 - paid sick day 15	-.57	3.2
	012 - teachers assume/related activities	.55	4.9
	048 - after school meetings mandatory for teachers	.49	4.6
	013 - salary increase merit only	.49	4.7

TABLE 2 - Continued

Factor	Nominal	Factor Loading	Mean
Building Administrative Power over Teachers	017 - building principal final decision curriculum matters	.81	3.8
	029 - class size determination by building principal	.80	4.2
	025 - strengthening building principal administration of school	.59	5.1
	003 - decrease power, building administrator	-.46	1.6
	039 - classroom discipline policy decided school building principal	.46	3.7
	020 - terms and conditions limited salary, fringe and other economic	.44	4.8
Board Unilateral Power	026 - board sole decision establish teacher work day	-.76	4.5
	018 - board sole decision establish pupil hours	-.73	4.8
	054 - peer evaluation tenure sole decision retention dismissal by teacher committee	.72	1.6
Retention of Board Power	055 - shared decision making working conditions between teachers/boards	.75	3.1
	005 - increase shared decision making building association leaders	.74	2.9
	030 - shared decision making teacher association board on teacher dismissal/retention	.65	2.0
	041 - stronger fair dismissal clause	.54	2.3
	011 - complete academic freedom	.47	1.8

examined for high loadings and their variable makeup analyzed. (Tables 1 and 2.) The principal concern of factor analysis is the fitting of a group of variables into a linear straight line relationship in which a smaller number of variables can account for most of that linearity. This can be accomplished by analysis of the correlations among the variables which will yield hypothetical factors derived from the original set of variables. The process of interpreting each factor is accomplished by identifying those variables with large factor loadings. The varimax rotated factors yielded a total of eight teacher factors (Table 1) and seven school board factors (Table 2).

One of the major tasks of the study was to determine how boards and teachers responded to the factors after having factor analyzed the original 55 items and having derived the factors. Each score of the factors for both teacher and board factors were treated as a dependent variable. Teacher and board respondents were treated as dummy independent variables. A Pearson Product Moment Correlation was used to determine the amount of difference or agreement between teachers' and boards' scores on the clusters. This procedure determined the strength of association between teachers and boards on the selected clusters.

In Table 3 are found the results of the eight teacher factors, the correlation and level of significance. The statistical process of using the clustered factors as the dependent variable and teacher/board status as dummy independent variables allow for the examination of what factors exhibit the most correlation. In fact, the strength of the correlation allows for the rank of the factors.

Because of the wording involved in the questionnaire design, some questions were structured to emit positive and negative feelings by both respondent groups. The questions were implicitly designed to allow both groups to reject or desire specific items. This explains the positive and negative correlations found in the clustered factors.

TABLE 3

TEACHER FACTOR CORRELATIONS

Teacher Factor	Rank	R	Significance Level*
1. Tenure/Job Security	6	.45	.000
2. Shared Decision Making	2	.65	.000
3. Merit Pay	4	.52	.000
4. Supplemental Time Off	3	-.61	.000
5. Shared Decision Making relating to Classroom Working Conditions and Policy	1	-.72	.000
6. Assigned After School Duties	5	.50	.000
7. Increased School Duties	6	-.45	.000
8. Organizational Power	8	-.39	.000

*The Statical Package Social Sciences program records a (.000) level score if significance is reached at a level exceeding .001. All eight factors attained a significance level exceeding the .001 level.

In the process of using teachers and boards as dummy independent variables, it must be remembered that the higher the correlation between teachers and boards, the greater the difference between teachers and boards on their scores. In interpreting the scores to see what clustered factors exhibit the most difference it was necessary to look for those scores with the high correlations, either positive or negative.

Board responses on the original 55 items differed significantly from the teacher responses. The board factors and the correlation between teachers and boards on those factors are presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4

BOARD FACTOR CORRELATIONS

Board Factors	Rank	R	Significance Level*
1. Supplemental Fringe Benefits	6	-.55	.000
2. Shared Decision Matters on Educational Policy	5	-.59	.000
3. Teacher Working Conditions	1	-.75	.000
4. Accountability	7	.52	.000
5. Building Administrative Power over Teachers	3	.62	.000
6. Board Unilateral Power	4	.60	.000
7. Retention of Board Power	2	-.73	.000

*The S.P.S.S. program records a (.000) level score if significance is reached at a level exceeding .001. All seven factors attained a significance level exceeding the .001 level.

A consolidated view of the data permits the examination of all 15 teacher and board factors. A correlation coefficient on each factor further permits ranking of each factor as to the greatest difference between teachers and boards. Table 5 lists the 15 teacher/board factors in rank order of the greatest variance.

Undertaking an examination of the consolidated factors is a rather complex process because of the multiplicity of educational facets that are encompassed in each of the combined 15 factors. Examination of the factors presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide the sub-variables that compose each factor. Review of the top five ranked factors reveals a trend toward teachers desiring to be involved in shared decision making regarding school working conditions

and educational policy. Teachers desire the unilateral power or at least the sharing of decisions related to professional teaching activity.

The board appears to adopt a stance that is opposite to the teacher's position. Boards are reluctant to grant teachers further intrusion into the decision-making process. The historical concept of management trying to retain power over labor is evident in the rankings of the factors.

The major hypothesis generated for testing in this study which stated that there is a significant difference in the perceptions of school board members and teacher executive leadership regarding the major items of negotiation, was tested in the null form using a test of significance associated with a Pearson Product Moment Correlation. Examination of Table 5 reveals that significance was obtained greater than the .001 level for boards and teachers on all 15 factors. Therefore, the stated hypothesis was accepted indicating that a significant difference exists between boards and teachers regarding impasse factors. This finding strongly supports Jones[3] data regarding school boards and teacher organizations in which he found a definite polarization between boards and administrators on one side and teachers on the other side in negotiations issues.

The testing of this hypothesis was particularly interesting in that all 15 factors were significantly different between teachers and boards. One might normally expect that some or perhaps a majority of the factors would be significantly different.

Discussion

Analysis of these 15 teacher/board factors (Table 5) reveals a significant polarization between teachers and boards of education. Boards of education

TABLE 5

PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE 15 TEACHER/BOARD FACTORS IN RANK ORDER

Factor No.	Factor Name	Rank	Pearson Correlation	Sig. Level*
Board: 3	Teacher working condition	1	-.75	.000
Board: 7	Retention of board power	2	-.73	.000
Teacher: 5	Shared decision making relating to classroom working conditions and policy	3	-.72	.000
Teacher: 2	Shared decision making	4	.65	.000
Board: 5	Building administrative power over teachers	5	.62	.000
Teacher: 4	Supplemental time off	6	-.61	.000
Board: 6	Board unilateral power	7	.60	.000
Board: 2	Shared decision making matters of educational policy	8	-.59	.000
Board: 1	Supplemental fringe ben.	9	-.55	.000
Teacher: 3	Merit pay	10	.52	.000
Board: 4	Accountability	11	.52	.000
Teacher: 6	Assigned after school duties	12	.50	.000
Teacher: 1	Tenure/job security	13	.45	.000
Teacher: 7	Increased school duties	14	-.45	.000
Teacher: 8	Organizational power	15	-.39	.000

*The S.P.S.S. program records a (.000) level score if significance is reached at a level exceeding .001. All fifteen factors attained a significance level exceeding the .001 level.

and teachers have adopted the labor-management model of negotiations and will continue to operate under it for some time to come. The flexible, but perhaps relatively unproductive from the teachers' perspective, pattern of negotiations found prior to the introduction of collective bargaining legislation has been replaced by a more formal negotiation structure.

From the analysis of the 15 derived factors found in this study, it is obvious that teachers strongly desire to become more actively involved in decision making. Ambrosie and Heller[4] in a study of secondary school administrators and teachers relative to teacher perceived participation in decision-making found that teachers strongly desired participation in policy making matters related to their conditions of work. They further concluded that, "More active participation in decision-making may receive the highest priority by teachers." In a study by Hicks[5] of all school board presidents, teacher association presidents, and superintendents in Kansas, she found that all groups were in agreement on the fact that shared decision making is very important in the negotiations area. Hicks further found that board presidents highly valued local autonomy and local control. Local autonomy and control is paradoxical to the concept of increased shared decision making by teachers.

Hill[6] is a survey of 150 school board presidents and teacher association presidents in the United States found that school boards were keenly aware of teachers attempting to be involved in the decision-making process. Teacher association presidents were very much aware of the unilateral decision making by boards of education. Teacher association presidents were also aware of the aspirations of teachers to be involved in the decision making process. The findings of Hill's study drawn from a national sample, have particular signi-

ficance as they support the universal appeal of shared decision making by teachers.

Boards of education are reluctant to share decision regarding educational policy. Examination of the first five ranked factors of the present study (teacher working conditions, retention of board power, shared decision making relating to classroom working conditions and policy, shared decision making, and building administrative power over teachers) as presented in Table 5, reveals how acute the power struggle is between teachers and boards. All five factors relate to decision making between teachers and boards.

The first and second ranked factors relate to the boards' position on retaining policy making power on classroom decisions and not sharing in decisions between teacher and board. The third and fourth ranked factors corraborate the first two factors as they relate to teacher thrusts to gain in the sharing of decisions. One is in the area of classroom working conditions and the other in shared decision making in general.

The fifth highest ranked factor can be indirectly attributed to the boards' position of not sharing in decisions with teachers. The factor, building administrative power over teachers, reveals that boards do not want teachers to share in decisions with the building administrator. This would directly affect educational policy on a variety of matters, most notably, classroom working conditions. Principals are agents of the boards through the office of the superintendent and carrying out policy set by the boards of education. Therefore, to grant to teachers the sharing of decisions through building principals would in effect be inhibiting the board's power to make decisions.

This factor, building administrative power over teachers, lends increasing support to the problem of shared decision making between boards and teachers.

Lutz and Azzarelli[7] point out that teachers are well aware of the shared decision making problem. The awareness of the problem causes teachers to strive harder to achieve shared decision making power. This position is substantiated by the first two teacher factors found in the study under discussion here, shared decision making relating to classroom working conditions and policy, and shared decision making. Both factors are directly related to the problem of shared decision making.

The factor that ranked sixth and points to a potential impasse problem between teacher and board is supplemental time off. Two of the items that comprised this factor were the granting to teachers of three personal days and fifteen paid sick days. Teachers and boards displayed opposite views on this with teachers perceiving these items as desirous and boards perceiving these items as unnecessary. A possible conclusion is that many of the school districts participating in the study have two personal days off for teachers and the traditional 10 paid sick days and that boards feel that this is sufficient. It may also mean that any teacher thrusts in the area of increased time off will be met with resistance by boards of education and create potential impasse areas. School districts that provide less supplemental time off than their surrounding neighbor districts should be aware of the potential problem and be prepared to cope with it.

The two factors, board unilateral power and shared decision making on

educational policy can be examined together. These two factors are in general agreement with the first five factors which related to shared decision making. A phenomena that emerges in the factor, board unilateral power, when analyzing the items that comprise this factor is the concept of "sole decision" on the part of the board to make decisions. The board having the "sole decision" is evident in three of these items. The finding of these two factors lend increasing support to the concept of boards desiring the right to make sole decisions and not involving teachers in the decision making process. It also stresses the fact that teachers desire increased sharing in decisions and reject the idea of boards making "sole decisions".

The above two factors reveal a potential impasse area in negotiations relating to the concepts of boards of education desiring the right to make sole decisions and teachers desiring the ability to share in decisions relating to educational policy. Boards of education apparently feel there are certain decisions which are the sole prerogative of the board and want no intrusion on these matters by teachers. Teachers, on the other hand, feel that certain board prerogatives directly affect their professional lives and that they should be given a certain amount of involvement in decision making on these matters.

Another factor that appears to be a possible conflict area is supplemental fringe benefits. Two of the major items that contribute to this factor were paid life insurance and paid dental insurance. A possible explanation of the

potential problem could be that the items appear frivolous and not a justifiable necessity for improving conditions for teaching. Boards scored these items very low and in essence rejected them. Teachers appear to take a mild but stronger stand on these two items. A greater difference appears in two additional items that comprise this factor, paid extended hospital benefits and 100 percent paid basic hospital plan. Teachers perceived these items as highly desirous. Board scores tended to fall toward the low part of the questionnaire scale. The high scores for teachers apparently account for the amount of difference between boards and teachers.

The factor, supplemental fringe benefits, along with the factor, supplemental time off, point to a potential problem between teachers and boards in that each side has a different perception of what is supplemental and what is a legitimate item that a teacher is entitled to. It is interesting to note that these two factors appeared both relating to what could be termed supplemental benefits and not directly related to the teaching process.

Two factors, ranked tenth and eleventh, can also be examined together as potential impasse items. Merit pay ranked tenth and accountability ranked eleventh. Teachers strongly rejected merit pay or salary increase by merit only. Two items that were comprised in the merit pay factor were salary increase by merit only and merit pay plan. Boards of education via the factor accountability wanted teachers held accountable by the process of merit pay. The process of merit pay and accountability are intertwined together. The proper functioning of merit pay depends on evaluation of personnel for rewards. The party who maintains the control of these economic inducements can hold the receiving

party under an enormous amount of control. This control can be called accountability as the receiving party can be evaluated and held accountable for its actions which relate to its receiving monetary rewards. Any attempt to introduce a merit pay plan or a program that is basically a type of accountability will be met with serious resistance by teachers. Programs that have accountability in their format are going to be resisted by teachers unless teachers are granted input into the structuring of any such programs and they do not result in threatening teacher security.

The factors, assigned after school duties, and increased school duties, point to potential impasse. Both of these factors relate to increased teacher duties. Examination of assigned after school duties reveals that teachers scored the two major items that comprised this factor very low. A notable exception in this factor was the variable, elimination of outside classroom activities, which teachers scored highly. Teachers apparently do not want outside classroom activities eliminated and perhaps feel these are important. However, it is felt that boards and teachers will have serious problems resolving proposals on increased school duties regardless if its during the school day or after school duties. In attempting to resolve this issue close attention will need to be given to the possibility that many extra curricular activities of students will be inhibited.

The question of tenure proved to be another impasse possibility. Teachers were drastically opposed to abolishing tenure or increasing the tenure period. The factor, tenure/job security, denoted differences between teachers and boards. Two major items that went into this factor were elimination of tenure and increasing the probationary period for tenure from five to seven years.

Boards were mildly agreeable to abolishing tenure and opposed to increasing the probationary period. This appears paradoxical at first examination, but the conclusion could be reached that abolishing tenure would be beneficial, assuming that incompetant teachers would be released. However, increasing the probationary period before tenure was granted could result in teacher-school board difficulties.

The factor, organizational power, was strongly opposed by boards and mildly desired by teachers. Boards rejected the variables constituting this factor as it strengthened the teacher associations. Teachers, however, apparently place less emphasis on overall organizational power to achieve their aims.

In Summary

Lieberman[8] stated that the Taylor Law caught public education in New York State cold. Both boards of education and teachers had little knowledge of collective bargaining. Lacking definite direction, boards and teachers began negotiating using the labor-management model for bargaining. Helsby[9], commenting on the New York law reported that, "Board members did not have the time, experience, bargaining sophistication, or stamina to negotiate effectively." This same condition also existed for teacher groups. Local, state, and national teachers organizations began to set up workshops and issue reports to orientate their membership as the negotiation movement spread across the nation. School boards and teacher associations quickly reacted and began building their knowledge base for use in assisting their members. Activities ranged from simulation techniques to a list of do's and don'ts in negotiations.

Teachers and school boards both have certain concerns that they desire and value. It appears from our experience in the negotiation process as if the position

of each side are frequently in direct confrontation with each other. Understanding of these differences is crutial if any hope of resolving these differences is to be made. The fifteen teacher and school board factors, which were perceived as leading to impasses identified in this study, can by synthesized into five major potential problem areas. The five, in ranked order of greatest problem potential for impasse are: 1) Shared decision making on educational policy and working conditions. 2) Supplemtntal benefits including time off and fringe benefits. 3) Merit pay and accountability. 4) Tenure and job security, and, 5) Increased school duties.

Those responsible for negotiating for school boards and teacher groups must be aware of these potential impasse areas. In addition, they should be striving to develop viable strategies for dealing with these key issues at the negotiations table. This could possibly lead to fewer problems and greater harmony in teacher-school board relations.

NOTES

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